The Western Balkans Anti-Disinformation Hub’s media monitoring of the second quarter of 2024 detected that anti-democratic actors continued to use narratives about unsettled historical and current issues to increase tensions in the Western Balkans (WB) region. While globally present anti-Western narratives, such as those about Russian aggression, continued to affect the public, media attention shifted toward more local issues. Pre-election campaigns, the Srebrenica genocide controversy, Kosovo-Serbia relations, and variants of the “Greater Albania” conspiracy theory used to incite inter-ethnic hate and increase Euroscepticism, marked this observation period.
The UN resolution vote on the Srebrenica genocide expectingly drew a disinformation campaign driven by a Serbian political agenda, framing the event as an assault on the Serbian nation, manifested as denial, distortion, or misrepresentation of the events surrounding the massacre that occurred in July 1995 during the Bosnian War. Key political voices included Ivan Stoilkovic’s Serbian Democratic Party (PDS) in North Macedonia, ridiculing the genocide by calling it “necrophiliac Disneyland,” and Milorad Dodik, the leader of Republika Srpska (RS) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who heightened tensions by explicitly threatening to secede RS from the unified state. Furthermore, Kremlin-affiliated individuals have backed Serbia, aligning with Moscow’s foreign policy objectives in the Balkans. This partnership enables Russia to preserve its influence in the region, which it considers strategically important.
“Evergreen” Balkan narratives around Kosovo-Serbia and “Greater Albania” continue to shadow political developments, reinforcing negative stereotypes of ethnic Albanians in the WB as a “source of crime and hatred” on one side and populistically advocating for the unification of all ethnic Albanians across the region on the other. Both are used as means to distract the public from pressing issues through fearmongering.
2024, being a global elections year, didn’t surpass the WB. Disinformation and competing narratives played a pivotal role, especially in shaping voter perceptions and choices in the WB, where the tension between pro-European Union aspirations and authoritarian tendencies is already heightened.
As political dynamics change, especially during election periods, NGOs faced increased pressure. This has been seen in the case of Georgia’s ‘foreign agents’ bill and Republika Srpska’s proposed ‘foreign agent’ law, which would require media, nongovernmental organizations, and other nonprofits to register as “pursuing the interests of a foreign power” if they receive funding from abroad. This poses a significant threat to the independence and effectiveness of NGOs, limiting their ability to advocate for transparency, human rights, and media freedom. It could lead to further suppression of civil society and weaken democratic accountability.
This report is based on a continuous monitoring process of online media perused by the audiences in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, which also includes monitoring of social networks.
